degree of passion and controversy that have followed some of its decisions on race relations and criminal procedure. Consequently, their impact may be greater. For example, Wasby (1970, p. 103) suggests that "an area of law in which it is often speculated that considerable impact has occurred is antitrust, but much of what has been written is speculation; we are without studies to match the speculation."
The present study attempts to redress partially the balance in impact studies with an analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court on economic policy-making in the United States Courts of Appeals. The focus is on the labor and antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals from 1950 through 1977.
Much of the literature on the impact of the Supreme Court on lower courts has dealt with their compliance with specific decisions of the Supreme Court. Although such studies have illuminated some significant problems, a compliance focus inevitably misses much of the dynamics of the relationships between courts in our federal system. Lower courts may fail to support the basic policy of the Supreme Court without being overtly noncompliant with any specific decision (see Wasby, 1970 , ch. 2 for a discussion of the problem). As Beatty (1972, p. 261) puts it, there are many ways for courts to "avoid, mitigate or nullify the ruling or advice of the Court" which stop short of overt defiance or noncompliance. Therefore, to gain a more complete understanding of the significance of the constitutional rules announced by the Supreme Court, a broader concept of impact needs to be used. A further problem with the use of a compliance model is that the focus on a few selected decisions is too narrow to gauge the impact of the Court on a given policy area. Canon (1973) maintains that the central significance of the Court for constitutional development is not the specific decisions it makes but the broad policies it fashions from a series of decisions. Baum (1977) expands on this idea to argue that much of an appellate court's policy leadership is exercised through the establishment of decisional trends that signal its inclination without creating a complete set of explicit rules of law. He suggests that there is a great need for research designed to measure the response of lower courts to these more general "decisional trends" of appellate courts in a wide variety of policy areas.
The analysis reported below examines the policy leadership exerted by the Supreme Court on the labor and antitrust decisional trends in the United States Courts of Appeals. It is generally believed that judicial decisions which lack clarity because of their complexity are less likely to have positive impact on the courts below (Johnson and Canon, 1984, p. 49) . Since labor and antitrust policies are by nature complex (Johnson and Canon, 1984 , p. 32), it might be speculated that the impact of the Supreme Court in these policy areas will be relatively modest. However, if the direction of Supreme Court policy is substantially altered through a series of decisions, the overall change in the decisional trends of the Court should be quite clear even if the details of some specific decisions remain somewhat ambiguous. Therefore, the capability of the Supreme Court to influence the decisional trends of lower courts should not be hampered by the complexity of its decisions. Since labor and antitrust decisions of the Supreme Court have not generally stimulated widespread intense controversy and since there are no other obvious environmental pressures on the lower courts to disregard Supreme Court policy leadership, it is expected that the Court will have a substantial impact on the labor and antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals. Specifically, it is hypothesized that after any statistically significant change in the percentage of liberal decisions announced by the Supreme Court in either of the policy areas under investigation, there will be a statistically significant change in the same direction in the percentage of liberal decisions announced by the United States Courts of Appeals. 
DATA AND METHODS

The initial analysis of the impact of the
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS
The data in table 1 demonstrate that with a one-year time lag, the labor decisional trends on the courts of appeals followed the change in Supreme Court policy as predicted by the hypothesis. After the dramatic increase in Supreme Court liberalism, the percentage of liberal decisions in the courts of appeals increased by 9.1%, a difference that is significant at the .001 level. However, the response by the courts of appeals following the Supreme Court's return to a more conservative orientation is somewhat ambiguous. Although the courts of appeals also became more conservative, the magnitude of the change was much more modest, and the difference failed to reach the .05 level of significance. Although the findings are not without some ambiguity, they do provide considerable support for the hypothesis. Following each of the four changes in the decisional trends of the Supreme Court, the trends in the courts of appeals moved in the same direction. In three of the cases the differences were statistically significant and in the remaining case the differences were only moderately less than that required for statistical significance.
Although these changes in the decisional trends on the courts of appeals are consistent with the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact, alternative explanations are possible. It is well established that there are frequently partisan differences in the voting behavior of appeals court judges (Goldman, 1966 (Goldman, , 1975 , and in fact, party differences are evident in the data analyzed above. In labor cases, 57.0% of the votes cast by Democratic judges were liberal compared to 52.0% for Republican judges-a difference which is significant at the .001 level. In antitrust policy Democrats also cast liberal votes more frequently than their Republican counterparts: 42.7% compared to 38.5%. These differences are significant at the .01 level. The existence of such partisan differences raises the possibility that the changes in the decisional trends of the courts of appeals may be due to changes in the partisan composition of the lower courts rather than to any Supreme Court influence.
In order to assess this alternative explanation, the votes of individual judges are analyzed in each time period with a control for the party of the appointing president. The data are displayed in tables 3 and 4. The changes in the voting patterns of Republican judges are consistent with the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact. For both labor and antitrust policy, the proportion of liberal Republican votes increased to a statistically significant degree after the Warren Court policies became established and then decreased to a statistically significant extent after the policy changes adopted by the Burger Court. Democratic judges also followed the trends set by the Supreme Court in both labor and antitrust policy, and the magnitude of the changes was significant at the .01 level in three of the four cases. Although the proportion of the liberal votes cast by Democratic judges is higher than the corresponding figure for Republican judges in each of the three time periods for both policy areas, it is significant that the trends over time for both parties follow the direction of the changes enacted by the Supreme Court. This finding that the voting patterns in both parties followed Supreme Court trends strengthens the support for the proposition that the court has had a significant impact on the decisional trends of the courts of appeals and that the observed changes in the courts of appeals were not due to personnel turnover. However, the use of a party control is only a partial test of turnover effects. Since significant presidential appointment effects have been noted even within parties for federal judges (Carp and Rowland, 1983) , the possibility remains that the observed changes were produced by the appointment of judges after the Supreme Court policy shift who were ideologically more in tune with the new policy than were previously appointed judges. Although no independent measure of judges' ideologies was available, this alternative was explored by comparing the voting tendencies of holdover judges before and after the changes in Supreme Court policy.4 Such an analysis, however, supports the original hypothesis rather than the alternative explanation that new judges were responsible for changes in the decisional trends of the courts of appeals. In labor policy, the proportion of liberal votes cast by holdover judges increased from 49.6% prior to 1960 to 57.3% in the middle period and then decreased to 55.9% after 1970.5 In antitrust policy, the proportion of liberal votes cast by holdover judges increased from 37.8% to 46.8%. The holdovers from the period 1958 to 1974 decreased their support for liberal outcomes from 43.9% to 35.2% after 1974.6 If the Supreme Court does have a significant effect on the decisions of appeals courts judges, then policy changes adopted by the Court should create new precedents which authoritatively settle some previously unsettled questions and/or which require that previously settled questions now be decided in a different manner. Songer (1982) has argued that a significant proportion of the cases decided by the courts of appeals should be classified as "consensual" cases because the precedents relevant to the decision are so clear and so generally perceived to be binding that all judges, regardless of their ideology, will feel constrained to decide them in the same way. His findings suggested that unanimous affirmances by the courts of appeals are almost always such consensual cases. But if Supreme Court policy change results in new, clear, binding precedents, the cases which would be consensual in one time period might not be consensual in the next period. Therefore, the decisional trends even among these "consensual" cases in the courts of appeals should follow changes in the decisional trends of the Supreme Court if the thesis of the present study is correct. To test this proposition, the decisional trends in the courts of appeals for unanimous affirmances of the district court or regulatory agency decision below were analyzed.
The results support the original hypothesis. For both labor and antitrust cases, the proportion of liberal decisions consistently moves in the I A judge was classified as a "holdover" or a "new" judge on the basis of their appointing president rather than their individual date of appointment. Although such a convention, necessitated by the way in which the data were coded, may introduce some inaccuracies (e.g., for labor policy, those few Eisenhower judges appointed in 1960 were classified as holdovers), it does not seem likely that it would significantly affect the results. The only break point between time periods located in the middle of a presidential administration is the division of the first two periods for antitrust policy. Consequently a separate analysis was performed on all Eisenhower appointees, and none were classified as holdover judges. In summary, the analysis reported above suggests that the Supreme Court exercises considerable impact on the general trends in economic policy-making in the United States Courts of Appeals. Even when analysis was confined to judges of a single party, holdover judges, or consensual cases, the trends in the courts of appeals followed the changes in decisional trends of the Supreme Court. The findings reported above of shifts in the decisional trends of the courts of appeals following policy changes in the output of the Supreme Court do not provide definitive proof of causation. It remains possible, for example, that statutory changes or changes in Justice Department prosecution policy were responsible for the shifts on both courts. However, in the absence of any direct evidence to support these alternative explanations, they appear less plausible than the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact.
The major unexplained finding was the failure of the change in the labor decisions of the courts of appeals after 1970 to reach normal standards of statistical significance. The data displayed in table 3 suggest that this failure was due solely to the response of Democratic judges. Although their voting decisions moved in the expected direction, the magnitude of the change was quite modest. A tentative explanation of these results might be found in the suggestion of Carp and Rowland (1983) that the guidelines coming from the Burger Court were more ambiguous than those emanating from the Warren Court. Consequently, judges may have gained relatively more freedom to take their decision-making cues from personal and partisan values after 1970 rather than from guidelines set forth by the High Court. 
